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Abstract: Basil’s Address to Young Men on How to Read Greek 
Literature is often read as an imitation of Plutarch’s How to Study 
Poetry. Exploring the authors’ connections more generally, I suggest 
that Basil has relied on Plutarch’s approach in both the Moralia 
and the Lives to make the central argument of his essay, which 
is a justification for the reading of pagan literature in a Christian 
context. Basil follows Plutarch in his moralizing interpretations of 
historical anecdotes and in turning to Plato’s Republic for philo-
sophical support, but he also adapts Plutarch’s approach to fit the 
social, religious, and political climate of his times.*
The Address to Young Men on How to Read Greek Literature, writ-
ten by Basil, Bishop of Caesarea, probably in the 370s, has often been 
compared with works by Plutarch, to find a model for the essay and to 
suggest general Plutarchan influence on Basil’s thought and writing. Olga 
Alieva has summarized the history of this comparison in a paper recently 
delivered in Moscow. As Alieva shows, some scholars have concluded 
that Basil was borrowing directly from Plutarch, while others have found 
the evidence for Plutarch’s influence more ambiguous. Max Pohlenz, 
for instance, argues that Basil drew directly from Plutarch’s Progress in 
Virtue (Prof. in virt.), while Ernesto Valgiglio and Mario Naldini argue 
for the fundamental influence of Plutarch’s similarly-themed essay How 
to Study Poetry (De aud. poet.). Valgiglio, however, also finds in Basil an 
independence of form and spirit, and Naldini mentions originality in in-
terpretation, especially as related to Basil’s discussion of what is profitable, 
* I am very grateful to Noreen Humble for her advice and for sharing with me her 
forthcoming work on Plutarch in Byzantium. I would also like to thank the editor for 
helpful criticism and suggestions.
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or χρήσιμον, in pagan literature.1 N. G. Wilson takes a more analytical 
tack, admitting that he is not in fundamental disagreement with Pohlenz 
(he wrote before Valgiglio and Naldini), but nevertheless claiming not 
to have found “enough verbatim similarities to prove with … certainty 
that Basil was borrowing directly from Plutarch” (12). Even so, Wilson’s 
commentary identifies twenty points of contact between Basil’s text and 
the works of Plutarch, including similarities in vocabulary and phrasing, 
shared literary references, and common anecdotes about historical figures.2
Because of their shared themes and similarity of argument, Plutarch’s 
How to Study Poetry has sometimes been read in conjunction with Basil’s 
essay. In 1902 Frederick Padelford published English translations of the 
two essays in a single book, along with interpretive and comparative 
introductions. He notes in his preface that the essays had been paired 
as early as 1600, singling out the 1694 edition published at Oxford by 
the future Archbishop of Canterbury (8). In this article I also compare 
these two essays, following the lead of Valgiglio and Naldini, however, 
by taking into account the spirit and the form of the essays rather than 
focusing on verbatim borrowings from Plutarch in Basil’s text. My aim 
is to compare the authors’ approaches to the fundamental problem that 
motivates both essays, namely, how to justify the reading of literature (for 
Plutarch, that means Greek poetry, while Basil also includes prose works 
and speeches), when that literature is judged to be inferior to and even 
at odds with philosophy, in the case of Plutarch, or with Holy Scripture, 
in the case of Basil. While Basil probably turned to Plutarch for some 
of his anecdotes and even for some of his arguments, as Alieva’s survey 
shows, in what follows I demonstrate that both authors also draw upon 
different passages from Plato’s Republic in order to frame the problem of 
reading Greek literature, and they justify this reading by claiming that it 
serves as preparation for more advanced study. Making use of examples 
from Plutarch’s Lives as well as How to Study Poetry, I conclude that it is 
the authors’ like-minded, moralizing approach to Greek literature that 
is most responsible for the similarities between the two essays.3
1 See Alieva 1–2.
2 See also Boulenger 28-29, Pastorino, La Matina 84, and Hunter and Russell, who 
call Basil’s essay an imitation of Plutarch’s How to Study Poetry (2).
3 For an examination of Plutarch’s influence on early Christian authors, including 
Basil, see La Matina, who provides further bibliography. For Plutarch’s influence on 
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I will begin by examining the introductions to the essays, to consider 
the authors’ own statements about who their readers are and why they 
are writing. Plutarch addresses his essay on the study of poetry to Marcus 
Sedatus, who has a son, Cleander, about the same age as Plutarch’s son, 
Soclarus. Although he does not provide exact ages, Plutarch says that it 
would not be possible to keep the boys from studying poetry, implying, 
as Richard Hunter writes, that they are “beyond ‘elementary schooling’” 
and, in modern terms, “young adolescents” (169 n. 1). Thus they are 
ready to move ahead in their education with the serious reading of poetic 
literature. This is an urgent matter, according to Plutarch, because the 
young men might well need more oversight in their reading than they 
need when out on the streets (15a). Poetry can be dangerous because it 
presents fictional stories that are pleasant to hear, and therefore young 
students might read it indiscriminately and only for enjoyment, with-
out concern for discovering anything that is true or otherwise valuable 
within the fiction. But rather than address this danger by eradicating 
poetry altogether from his son’s curriculum, Plutarch advises Sedatus 
to seek out works of poetry that have beneficial, philosophical themes, 
and then to reject everything else (15f ). 
This is really the crucial point in Plutarch’s justification for his essay, 
namely that reading poetry is not an end in itself:
οὕτω τοὺς λόγους ἡ ποίησις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναλαμβάνουσα 
μιγνυμένους πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες ἐλαφρὰν καὶ προσφιλῆ παρέχει 
τοῖς νέοις τὴν μάθησιν. ὅθεν οὐ φευκτέον ἐστὶ τὰ ποιήματα τοῖς 
φιλοσοφεῖν μέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ προφιλοσοφητέον τοῖς ποιήμασιν 
ἐθιζομένους ἐν τῷ τέρποντι τὸ χρήσιμον ζητεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν.
Thus poetry, by taking up its themes from philosophy and blending 
them with fable, renders the task of learning light and agreeable for 
the young. And so those who are intending to pursue philosophy 
should not avoid poetry, but they should use poetry as an introduc-
tory exercise in philosophy by training themselves habitually to seek 
out and to be fond of what is profitable in pleasure (15f–16a).4
Byzantine literature in general, see Humble (forthcoming a), who shows that his works 
were known sporadically from the fourth century but appear to have enjoyed wide 
appeal and influence particularly beginning in the tenth century.
4 Text of Plutarch’s How to Study Poetry is from Babbitt; text of the Lives comes from 
the Teubner editions. Text of Basil’s essay is from Boulenger as corrected by Wilson. 
All translations are my own.
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Seeking out what is profitable (τὸ χρήσιμον) in literature makes the most 
obvious connection between the essays of Plutarch and Basil. Before 
turning to the Bishop of Caesarea, however, I would like to consider an 
unspoken component to Plutarch’s argument. Plutarch makes his case 
for reading literature in opposition to the idea that one should reject all 
poetry because some of it is dangerous. Lurking behind this opposition 
is likely to be the decision of Plato to ban poets from his fictitious city 
in the Republic, and by extension, to keep poetic influences away from 
the training of the human soul.5 Now, in the third book of the Republic 
where Socrates states that he will ask poets to leave the city (398a), Plato 
is primarily interested in keeping the guardian class from becoming imi-
tators of base men, as actors and singers of epic poetry are required to 
be when performing.6 But when he returns to the question of poetry in 
the tenth book, he is concerned about both imitation and the influence 
of performances on the audience. Socrates consents to giving poetry the 
chance to defend itself, but he also shows his skepticism by warning that 
“there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy” (παλαιὰ 
μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ, 607b), and he does not 
really expect that poetry will acquit itself. He will allow it to return to 
his city, however, if its defenders can show “that it is not only pleasur-
able but also beneficial both to constitutions and to human life” (ὡς οὐ 
μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν 
ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν, 607d).7
Scholars have interpreted the nature of the “ancient quarrel” men-
tioned by Socrates in various ways, but in general it must refer to the 
fact that poets and philosophers take different approaches to questions 
about political constitutions and human life. And regardless of what it 
might mean in the narrow context of Socrates’ argument in the Republic, 
Plutarch and other later readers would surely have interpreted it within 
the wider context of Plato’s fully developed philosophy. In a recent 
overview and reinterpretation of this quarrel, Glenn Most writes that, 
“From the early Ion through the more mature Symposium, Phaedrus, and 
5 Cf. Hunter and Russell 79.
6 Resp. 392c–398b; cf. White 97; Reeve 220–26.
7 Here Plato uses “ἡδεῖα” for “pleasurable” and “ὠφελίμη” for “beneficial,” whereas 
in the passage quoted above Plutarch used “τὸ τέρπον” and “τὸ χρήσιμον” for the 
corresponding nouns. Text of the Republic is from Slings.
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Republic, until the late Laws—to mention only these dialogues—Plato’s 
own quarrel with the poets is well established, deep-rooted, persistent, 
recurrent, explicit, and intense.”8 Plutarch would have been keenly aware 
of Plato’s various arguments for the danger to be found in poetry, and in 
considering the Republic in particular, he could have recalled the narrow 
criterion for allowing poetry back into the curriculum.9 He responds to 
this resistance by assuring Sedatus that he is advocating a very careful 
management of their sons’ educations:
μηδ’ ἡμεῖς οὖν τὴν ποιητικὴν ἡμερίδα τῶν Μουσῶν ἐκκόπτωμεν 
μηδ’ ἀφανίζωμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου μὲν ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἀκράτου πρὸς δόξαν 
αὐθάδως θρασυνόμενον ἐξυβρίζει καὶ ὑλομανεῖ τὸ μυθῶδες αὐτῆς 
καὶ θεατρικόν, ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι κολούωμεν καὶ πιέζωμεν· ὅπου 
δ’ ἅπτεταί τινος μούσης τῇ χάριτι καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λόγου καὶ 
ἀγωγὸν οὐκ ἄκαρπόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κενόν, ἐνταῦθα φιλοσοφίαν 
εἰσάγωμεν καὶ καταμιγνύωμεν.
Let us not cut out or destroy the Muses’ poetic vine, but wherever 
the fabulous and dramatic part, being boldly encouraged toward 
glory because of immoderate pleasure, becomes insolent and runs 
riot, let us gain control over it by pruning and pressing it back. 
But wherever the sweetness of speech touches upon sophistication 
through grace and as a guide is neither fruitless nor empty, let us 
bring in philosophy and mix it with the poetry (15f ).
Plutarch, willing to heal the ancient quarrel between poetry and phi-
losophy, nonetheless will keep the dramatic and fabulous elements of 
poetic performance in check, acknowledging, it seems, Plato’s special 
concern for the harm done when actors or singers imitate men of poor 
character or performers of bad deeds.
Basil tackles a similar problem in the introduction to his essay, 
seeking to allay the fears not of Platonists in this case, but of Christians 
who would object to the pagan values transmitted along with Greek 
literature. He responds to the presumed criticism in two ways. First, he 
takes a selective approach very similar to Plutarch’s, though in place of 
8 Most 2. See also Walker 294–302; Hunter 175–77; Barfield 10–31; Hunter and 
Russell 2–17.
9 For the influence of Plato’s Republic, Protagoras, and Laws on Plutarch’s view of 
poetry in this essay, see Hunter and Russell 2–9. On Plutarch’s Platonism in general, 
see Jones; Dillon 184–230; Opsomer.
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the vinedresser, pruning the bad and encouraging the good, Basil turns 
to the ship’s pilot for his analogy:
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ συμβουλεύσων ἥκω, τὸ μὴ δεῖν εἰς ἅπαξ 
τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ πλοίου τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας 
ὑμῶν παραδόντας, ᾗπερ ἂν ἄγωσι, ταύτῃ συνέπεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὅσον 
ἐστὶ χρήσιμον αὐτῶν δεχομένους, εἰδέναι τί χρὴ καὶ παριδεῖν.
This is precisely the advice that I have come to share with you: that 
you should not once and for all hand over the rudders of your mind, 
as of a ship, to these [pagan authors] and to follow them wherever 
they may lead, but accepting from them whatever is profitable, you 
should also know what to overlook (1.24–28).
The imagery of the ship might be inspired by Plutarch, who often 
speaks of reason as the pilot, or κυβερνήτης, of the soul, but ultimately 
it comes from Plato.10 In fact, the phrase used here, “handing over the 
rudders of your mind, as of a ship,” is almost certainly borrowed from 
the Clitophon.11 But this phrase might also have been inspired by, and 
so remind the knowledgeable reader, of a passage from the Republic, 
making Basil’s analogy richer and linking him even more generally to 
the Platonic tradition with which Plutarch also engaged. In book 6 of 
the Republic, Plato has Socrates compare the treatment received by a 
philosopher at the hands of his fellow citizens to the selection of a pilot 
(κυβερνήτης) of a ship. Sailors with no skill or training in piloting at-
tempt to persuade the ship’s owner to turn the rudder (πηδάλιον) over 
to them, claiming that the one who succeeds in this persuasion is “a 
sailor, good at steering, and an expert about sailing” (ναυτικὸν … καὶ 
κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν), when he really knows 
nothing at all about being a pilot, while the one who is not successful in 
persuading the ship’s owner but is nonetheless best suited to be the pilot 
because of his wisdom, they call “unprofitable” (ἄχρηστον, 488a–489a). 
The sailors, of course, are not wise enough themselves to recognize the 
10 In How to Study Poetry, Plutarch refers to education in general as traveling on the 
sea (15d, 37b); cf. Hunter 169. For κυβερνήτης as standing generally for reason that 
governs the soul in Plutarch, see Beneker 46–48.
11 At 408b2, Plato has Clitophon argue that it is better for a person to live as a slave than 
as a freeman, “having turned over the rudders of the mind, as of a ship, to someone else 
who has learned the skill of steering people” (καθάπερ πλοίου παραδόντι τὰ πηδάλια 
τῆς διανοίας ἄλλῳ, τῷ μαθόντι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικήν); cf. Wilson 40.
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man who in fact possesses the wisdom to be the ship’s true pilot, just as 
the average citizen in a city cannot perceive the wisdom or political skills 
of the philosopher. If we recall this passage from the Republic while read-
ing Basil’s admonition, then we can see that he is warning his nephews 
not to give in to the persuasion of the crowd of Greek authors, who 
might be appealing because their works give pleasure, but who in reality 
have nothing of value to offer. Rather, they should be discriminating, 
seeking out the works of those authors who are truly wise because they 
illustrate virtue.
Basil returns to this point in section 6 of his essay, once he has estab-
lished that learning about virtue is the thing that is profitable (χρήσιμον) 
in reading Greek literature: 
καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὧν δὴ καὶ λόγος τίς ἐστιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἢ μικρὸν 
ἢ μεῖζον εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν συγγράμμασιν 
ἀρετῆς ἔπαινον διεξῆλθον· οἷς πειστέον καὶ πειρατέον ἐπὶ τοῦ 
βίου δεικνύναι τοὺς λόγους.
And nearly all [writers] who have some reputation for wisdom have 
recounted a praise of virtue in their works to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on their ability. We must trust in these writers 
and attempt to demonstrate their words in the way we live (6.1–4).
Basil goes on to emphasize the importance of making virtue real, and 
he concludes this portion of his argument with what might be a double 
reference to the third book of the Republic. First, he says that the person 
who has not internalized virtue “will pursue the appearance of being 
good without in fact being so” (καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι 
διώξεται, 6.24). Here he seems to be loosely quoting a sentiment from 
Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι θέ-
λει, 592), which has been filtered through Plato, who names Aeschylus 
as his source (ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ᾽ Αἰσχύλον «οὐ δοκεῖν 
ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα,» Republic 361b).12 Second, in the next 
sentence Basil cites Plato by name, borrowing the assertion that to seem 
just while not being so is the extreme of injustice (ἀλλ᾽ οὗτός ἐστιν 
ὁ ἔσχατος τῆς ἀδικίας ὅρος, εἴ τι δεῖ Πλάτωνι πείθεσθαι, τὸ δοκεῖν 
δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα, 6.25–26). The reference is to Republic 361a 
(ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα), which comes just 
before Plato’s quotation of Aeschylus.
12 Cf. Wilson 56–57.
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Basil, then, has Plato very much in mind as he establishes his theme 
and lays the groundwork for his argument. If he has been inspired by 
Plutarch’s essay, then he appears to have looked not simply to its form, but 
also to have followed Plutarch’s lead in turning to Plato as he considered 
the problem of selecting the right readings from the great corpus of Greek 
literature. It seems likely to me, in fact, that both Basil and Plutarch 
are sailing the same sea (to continue the analogy) and engaging with a 
larger dialogue about how and why philosophers should read literature. 
The Platonic foundation of this dialogue would have been well known 
to both of them, and Plutarch might have served as an inspiration or a 
model of how to approach this ancient and fraught question.
Plutarch’s approach might also have shaped the second element of 
Basil’s response to his presumed critics. Another implied question that 
Plutarch addresses in his introduction may be phrased something like 
this: even if there is philosophical value in some poetry, why bother with 
this dangerous game of finding it among all sorts of empty pleasures when 
you can simply read philosophy directly? In response, Plutarch argues 
that poetry softens philosophy and, because it contains philosophical 
principles in an easier-to-understand form, serves as an introductory 
exercise in philosophy, or “pre-philosophy,” for young students: προφι-
λοσοφητέον τοῖς ποιήμασιν, Plutarch writes (15f ).13 Reading poetry, 
therefore, trains young men in philosophical principles and teaches 
them to seek out what is useful in what is pleasant.14 As Hunter puts it, 
Plutarch is advising that the young reader “be actively engaged in the 
reading process in a manner which prepares [him] for the cut and thrust 
of philosophic debate” (172). Basil takes a similar approach, although 
he is rebutting a slightly different hypothetical question: why read pa-
gan literature when we have Holy Scripture? His answer, however, is 
essentially the same. The study of Greek literature is not a replacement 
for the study of Scripture, but it serves as preliminary training for that 
later and more challenging endeavor: 
ἕως γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐπακούειν τοῦ βάθους τῆς διανοίας 
αὐτῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἐν ἑτέροις οὐ πάντη διεστηκόσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν 
σκιαῖς τισι καὶ κατόπτροις, τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμματι τέως προγυ-
μναζόμεθα, τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τακτικοῖς τὰς μελέτας ποιουμένους 
μιμούμενοι.
13 See the full passage quoted above, p. 97.
14 Plutarch returns to this point in the essay’s conclusion (36d–e); cf. Hunter 169–70.
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So long, then, as it is not possible due to your age to grasp the depth 
of the meaning [in the Scriptures], with the aid of the other writings, 
which are not entirely different, as if with the aid of shadows and 
mirrors, we must in the mean time do preliminary exercises for the 
eye of the soul, imitating those who practice military maneuvers 
(2027–31).15
In both essays, the assertion that reading Greek literature is a preliminary 
exercise must be made at the outset; otherwise the whole argument for 
the philosophical value of this literature becomes unnecessary. Further-
more, the idea of engaging in preliminary exercises as preparation for 
more advanced study is likely to have seemed quite natural to Basil, who 
himself might have been educated through rhetorical progymnasmata 
while studying as a young man under Libanius.16
If it is true that Basil followed Plutarch’s approach without verbatim 
borrowing or strict imitation, we might have an explanation for a minor 
but rather curious difference between the essays. Plutarch addresses his 
advice for studying poetry, as I have said, to Marcus Sedatus. This seems 
entirely logical, since the young Cleander’s education would be carried 
out under the supervision of his father, and indeed, careful supervision 
is just what Plutarch advocates. Basil is similarly concerned with the 
education of his nephews, but rather than address his argument to their 
parents, he writes to the young men directly. The boys’ ages, conjectured 
to be fifteen to sixteen years old, present something of a problem, since 
many of the literary references in the essay assume quite a lot of reading 
already in Greek literature, not only in standard authors, such as Homer 
and Hesiod, who might be encountered early in one’s schooling, but also 
15 By “the aid of shadows and mirrors” Basil is probably referring to the indirect 
observation of the truths that young men will eventually observe directly in Scripture. 
Plutarch uses the analogy of the mirror at Progress in Virtue 85a–b and Aemilius 1.1 
(see below) to refer to the observation of the character of historical figures via reading. 
Cf. Pelling, who explains that in the Aemilius Plutarch is suggesting that his readers 
“explore the experiences and dilemmas of those figures from the past, and ask what 
we would have done ourselves in their circumstances, or what they would have done 
in ours” (17); see Pelling’s n. 37 for further bibliography.
16 Libanius has left the largest collection of these preliminary rhetorical exercises and 
might have been the author of the treatise on progymnasmata that is usually ascribed 
to Hermogenes; see Kennedy 58–59; Gibson xx–xxv. For the influence of rhetoric on 
Basil’s theological writings, see Kustas.
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in more “advanced” authors such as the sophist Prodicus. “This argues,” 
Wilson writes, “a considerable degree of knowledge [in the young men], if 
not downright precocity” (8). This considerable degree of knowledge might 
indicate that Basil was, in fact, addressing the boys’ parents indirectly, 
and intending to reach other adult readers as well. Although his thesis 
is narrowly focused on education, this larger audience might well have 
needed convincing about the general value, and even the safety, of pagan 
literature only a decade or so after the brief reign of Julian, the apostate 
emperor. Julian himself had studied pagan Greek authors in a Christian 
environment as a youth. Thus he might have been a symbol of the dan-
ger that Basil seeks to mitigate.17 In any case, if Basil followed Plutarch’s 
example even to a small degree, he would not have left oversight of the 
critical and risky process of selection to the boys themselves.18 It seems 
that direct address to the boys’ parents might not have been well received, 
and so this might be the reason, perhaps deriving ultimately from political 
necessity, for Basil’s addressing his argument to the young men instead.
Turning from the framing of the problem to the authors’ general 
approach to the reading of literature, we notice how the two are again 
like-minded. Here I would like to broaden the comparison to include 
Plutarch’s Lives. In the introduction to the Aemilius Paulus, Plutarch 
claims that he began to write his biographies for the sake of others, but 
that he is continuing the series for himself, since he enjoys the effort 
of trying to arrange his life according to the virtues demonstrated by 
historical figures:
ἐμοὶ τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι’ ἑτέρους, 
ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι’ ἐμαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν 
ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ 
ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. οὐδὲν γὰρ 
ἀλλ’ ἢ συνδιαιτήσει καὶ συμβιώσει τὸ γινόμενον ἔοικεν, ὅταν 
ὥσπερ ἐπιξενούμενον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας 
ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ παραλαμβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶμεν «ὅσσος ἔην 
οἷός τε» (Hom. Il. 24.630), τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς 
γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνοντες.
17 On the date of Basil’s essay, see Wilson 9; Naldini 16–17. On Julian’s education in 
Greek literature, see Browning 34–39; Bowersock 23–24.
18 Cf. Hunter 174, on Plutarch: “Although the discussion of poetry will indeed sharpen 
the young man’s desire and aptitude to question, there is no suggestion that he is free to 
interpret outside the strict parameters with which he will be supplied by his teachers.”
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I happened to undertake the writing of these lives for the sake of 
others, but now I am continuing and enjoying them for my own 
sake. As if looking into a mirror (in some way or other), I try to use 
my investigation to give order to my life and to shape it according 
to the virtues of these men. For this experience is just like keeping 
a daily routine and living with them, whenever I welcome and 
receive each one of them in turn through my investigation, as if 
receiving a guest, and I observe “how great and of what character” 
each man is, deriving from his deeds what is most important and 
finest to know (1.1–2).
Basil expresses a similar sentiment, as part of his argument that read-
ing Greek literature (of all types, not simply poetry) is critical to the 
preliminary training that later allows one to understand Holy Scripture:
καὶ ποιηταῖς καὶ λογοποιοῖς καὶ ῥήτορσι καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις 
ὁμιλητέον ὅθεν ἂν μέλλῃ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ὠφέλειά 
τις ἔσεσθαι.
One must keep company with poets, prose writers, and orators, 
and with all men from whom one may find some benefit when it 
comes to the care of the soul (2.37–39).
Although Basil here focuses on the authors, he clearly has “kept 
company” with the characters from literature and history as well. For 
instance, he recounts anecdotes about Odysseus (4.10–11, 5.25–42), 
Pericles (7.9–11), and Polydamus, an Olympic athlete (8.22–24), in 
addition to quoting from such authors as Plato, Prodicus (5.55–77), 
and Euripides (6.22–24). 
An anecdote about Alexander the Great creates another point of 
comparison between the two authors, showing again how Plutarch and 
Basil sailed the same interpretive sea. In the Alexander Plutarch relates 
the story of how the Macedonian king behaved with great moderation 
after capturing the wife and daughters of the Persian king, Darius, despite 
their exceptional beauty. He relates the story so as to make Alexander’s 
self-control fundamental to his identity as king:
καίτοι λέγεταί γε τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα πολὺ πασῶν τῶν βασι-
λίδων εὐπρεπεστάτην γενέσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸς Δαρεῖος 
ἀνδρῶν κάλλιστος καὶ μέγιστος, τὰς δὲ παῖδας ἐοικέναι τοῖς 
γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς ἔοικε τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους 
τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλικώτερον ἡγούμενος, οὔτε τούτων ἔθιγεν, 
οὔτ᾽ ἄλλην ἔγνω γυναῖκα πρὸ γάμου πλὴν Βαρσίνης.
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And yet it is said that Darius’ wife was by far the most attractive 
of all the royal women, just as Darius himself was the finest and 
tallest of the men, and that his daughters took after their parents. 
But Alexander, as it seems, believed that it was more king-like to 
master himself than to conquer his enemies, and so he neither 
touched these women, nor was he intimate with any other woman 
before marriage, except for Barsine (21.6–7).
In framing the anecdote in this way, Plutarch connects his portrait of 
Alexander to Classical Greek notions about the intersection between a 
statesman’s private, personal behavior (especially his ability to exercise 
self-restraint), and his public, political success.19 Xenophon, for instance, 
expresses a similar sentiment in his encomium of Agesilaus, praising 
the Spartan king for acknowledging the danger in accepting a young 
man’s kiss and remarking that “I am quite sure, however, that many 
more men are able to master their enemies than to master such desires 
as these” (ἐγὼ μέντοι δοκῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι πολὺ πλέονες τῶν πολεμίων ἢ 
τῶν τοιούτων δύνανται κρατεῖν, Xen. Ages. 5.6). 
Basil also invokes the example of Alexander, reading it in essentially 
the same way as Plutarch and drawing a similar conclusion. In the spirit 
of his argument, which conceives of such anecdotes as preliminary to the 
study of Scripture, Basil goes on to make the connection to Christian 
teaching overtly:
οὐδ’ ἂν παρέλθοιμι τὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃς τὰς θυγατέρας Δαρεί-
ου αἰχμαλώτους λαβὼν θαυμαστόν τι οἷον τὸ κάλλος παρέχειν 
μαρτυρουμένας οὐδὲ προσιδεῖν ἠξίωσεν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κρίνων 
τὸν ἄνδρας ἑλόντα γυναικῶν ἡττηθῆναι. τουτὶ γὰρ εἰς ταὐτὸν 
ἐκείνῳ φέρει, ὅτι ὁ ἐμβλέψας πρὸς ἡδονὴν γυναικί, κἂν μὴ τῷ 
ἔργῳ τὴν μοιχείαν ἐπιτελέσῃ, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῇ ψυχῇ 
παραδέξασθαι, οὐκ ἀφίεται τοῦ ἐγκλήματος.
Nor should we pass by the story of Alexander, who took the daugh-
ters of Darius prisoner and, although they were reported to exhibit 
an amazing beauty, he did not think it right to look upon them. 
Rather, he judged it to be a shameful thing for a man who had 
conquered other men to be defeated by women. For this amounts 
to the same thing as in that saying, that the one who has looked 
upon a woman with pleasure has committed adultery, even if he 
has not acted, but because he has admitted desire into his soul, he 
is guilty of the crime (7.40–47).
19 For Classical attitudes, see e.g. Dover 208; Davidson 250–308.
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“That saying” comes from the Gospel of Matthew (5.28). The notion of 
a crime is, of course, part of Judeo-Christian ethics, but Plutarch (and 
Plato and Xenophon, too, for that matter) would have acknowledged 
the transgression that lies behind the guilt: allowing ἐπιθυμία free reign 
is something that must be guarded against. For Basil, this element of 
the anecdote is solidly based in Scripture, since in Matthew the crime 
also results from looking upon a woman with desire:
ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι 
αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ.
And I say to you that anyone who looks upon a woman so as to 
desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart 
(Mat. 5.28).
Both authors’ use of this anecdote, then, neatly demonstrates the ethical 
connection between pagan and Christian thought that Basil found so 
valuable, and we may observe how their like-minded reading of the same 
literature has led to similar conclusions. Plutarch’s interpretation of this 
anecdote might have been appealing to Basil, and Plutarch might even 
have been his source.20 Even so, Basil’s effort to give the anecdote a par-
ticularly Scriptural, Christian interpretation shows that he is grappling 
with a problem common to other Byzantine writers. In her study of the 
Anacreontic poems by John of Gaza, for instance, Frederica Ciccolella 
argues that John turned to allegory in order to circumvent “the ethical 
rejection of myth promoted by Neoplatonism and Christianity.” This 
allegorical interpretation, she argues, “was a way of keeping the study 
of pagan literature alive in a Christian background” (94–95).21 While 
not relying on allegory in his reading of the anecdote about Alexander, 
Basil nonetheless adapts (or updates) the earlier, pagan interpretation 
of Alexander’s self-restraint so that it matches the expectations of his 
contemporary, Christian audience.
In conclusion, I would like to quote part of a short, eleventh-century 
Byzantine poem by Johannes Mauropus, written well after Basil’s time 
but expressing a sentiment which, given his adaptation of Plutarchan 
20 See Valgiglio 77; Naldini 192.
21 On the date of John of Gaza, see Cameron. For Basil’s relationship to Neoplatonism, 
see Rist.
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and Platonic ideas to Christian theology, the Bishop of Caesarea prob-
ably would have endorsed:
εἴπερ τινὰς βούλοιο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
τῆς σῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐξελέσθαι, Χριστέ μου,
Πλάτωνα καὶ Πλούταρχον ἐξέλοιό μοι·
ἄμφω γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ λόγον καὶ τὸν τρόπον
τοῖς σοῖς νόμοις ἔγγιστα προσπεφυκότες.
If you should wish to exempt anyone among the pagans from 
your punishment, my Christ, may you exempt for me Plato and 
Plutarch. For both of these men clung most closely to your laws in 






22 For the full text, see Trypanis. See Humble (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming 
b) on the general compatibility between Plutarch’s ethics and the Christian values 
of Byzantine writers, and also for the possible influence of his Lives on the form of 
historical writing in the tenth century.
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